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Abstract The aim of this article is to explore whether people who are blind are as successful
in recognising other people’s mental states in communicative situations as people who are
sighted. In the current investigation, a group of blind and sighted individuals were tested on
their first and higher-order ToM abilities to recognise the intentions, feelings and beliefs of
people engaged in natural conversations. The results revealed significant differences between
the groups in the recognition ofmental states, but no differenceswere found in their first-order
and higher-order ToM use. The study shows that people who are blind may understand other
people’s intentions, feelings and beliefs differently than people who are sighted. This is not
because of their ToM deficits or linguistic incompetence, but because during communication
blind individuals have limited access to the information about others’ mental states.
Keywords Blindness · Communication · Theory of mind · Mindreading · Adults
Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM), generally defined as the ability to impute mental states to one-
self and others (Premack and Woodruff 1978), is integral to the process of communication.
Because what is normally said does not fully determine what is actually meant (Sperber and
Wilson 2002), it is constantly necessary for listeners to make inferences about a speaker’s
mental states in order to understand their messages, judge their behaviour, and predict their
responses. This (at least partially) is possible through observing the speaker’s actions, facial
expressions, gestures and other non-verbal cues. Among other things, visual cues allow an
individual to recognise a conversation partner’s attitude or attentional direction; to monitor
their understanding of a message (Clark and Krych 2004), or to surrender the floor when the
partner wishes to take a turn (Kendon 1967; Agryle 1973; Bavelas et al. 2002). It appears
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clear that vision has the power to provide important information about people’s mental states,
but whether the lack of visual cues impairs ToM is far from obvious.
Onemay expect that blind people who are deprived of visual information and can only rely
on linguistic experience, will be less successful in inferring other people’s communicative
intentions. In other words, the information which people with visual impairments (VI) have
access to andwhich should allow them to attributemental states to their conversation partners,
is different from the information accessible to people with normal vision. Hence, it appears
well-justified to askwhether the amount of information accessible to blind people during daily
communication allows them to successfully “read other people’s minds”. Without knowing
whether linguistic information can effectively compensate for the missing visual cues, it
is not possible to ascertain whether people who are blind should have visual information
verbally provided to them during communication in order to improve their understanding
of messages. Therefore, the aim of this article is to explore ToM use in blind people and
to investigate whether these individuals, if provided with no visual information, can be as
successful in recognising other people’s mental states in communicative situations as people
who are sighted.
For many years it has been argued that vision plays a critical role in ToM development
and children with VI are significantly delayed in acquiring ToM abilities (Minter et al.
1998; Sonksen and Dale 2002; Korkmaz 2011). Studies using modified ToM tasks based on
auditory and/or tactile experience (see Table 1 for more detailed descriptions of the tasks),
showed that children who were blind were less successful than their peers with normal vision
(e.g. Brambring and Asbrock 2010; Green et al. 2004; McAlpine and Moore 1995; Minter
et al., ibid.; Peterson et al. 2000). Researchers explained that the poor performance of blind
children was due to the fact that the individuals had little experience in social interactions and
they had not learnt about other people’s mental states by observing their facial expressions,
gestures and other non-verbal behaviour. At the same time the studies indicated that it is
much more difficult to attribute mental states to others on the basis of verbal information
only. Therefore, it was concluded that by missing out visual cues blind children miss out on
an important (pragmatic) part of a conversation which enable sighted individuals to resolve
“the discrepancy between what is actually understood about the experience of another person
and what would be expected on the basis of verbal competence” (Dyck et al. 2004, p. 791).
For the above-mentioned reason, ToM deficits in blind individuals are often argued to affect
their pragmatic language abilities of interpreting intended meanings of people’s utterances
(see e.g. James and Stojanovik 2007; Tadic´ et al. 2010).
Only recently, however, it has been suggested that vision may not be necessary for the
development of ToM, and that congenital blindness does not have to affect mindreading.
Recent studies show that the delays in the development of ToM are more specific to children
whose blindness is linked to neural causes (ocular-plus blindness), and that the performances
of children with ocular blindness in relevant ToM tasks do not differ from sighted children
(Beeger et al. 2014). Similarly, a study performed on children with a broad range of VI
(including low vision) demonstrates no deficits in the participants’ ToM or pragmatic lan-
guage abilities (Pijnacker et al. 2012). This indicates that ToM development may not depend
on visual experience. Finally, fMRI studies have revealed that ToM in congenitally blind and
in sighted adults is selectively localised in the same brain regions, which include the bilateral
temporoparietal junction, medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and anterior temporal sulci
(Bedny et al. 2009). The findings show that blindness does not change the ToM network and
blind individuals develop ToM independently of visual experience. This suggests that blind
people are mentally equipped to recognise other people’s thoughts, feelings and intentions,
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but it remains unknownwhether the information they are provided with during a conversation
allows them to be as successful in mindreading as people who are sighted.
Blind individuals learn about mental states from linguistic experience and they use this
source to inferwhat others think, feel or believe during communication.Although it is true that
a substantial amount of information can be provided not only bywhat people say but also how
they say it, no studies have been performed to reveal how accurate blind people’s inferences
are about others’ mental states. Because the sense of sight carries different information than
hearing, it is possible that having no access to visual information or to the descriptions of
what others can see, a blind individual may be unable to adequately recognise the emotional
content of a speaker’s utterance and, for example, to distinguish between when the speaker
is angry and when she or he just pretends to be so. Also, without the access to visual cues,
it may not be possible for the blind person to follow other people’s actions and predict
their behaviour. This is in comparison to a person who has unlimited access to both visual
and auditory information during communication. Because presently there are hardly any
tests which are designed to detect ToM difficulties in real communicative situations, it is
impossible to determine whether blind people are less successful in reading the minds of
their communication partners than sighted people, and whether their visual limitations may
affect their performance.
Until now ToM in typically developing children and normal adults has been examined
via the use of different tasks (see Table 2 for review) which were developed to explore
different ToM mechanisms. These tasks were based on either the observation of situations
and pictures, or listening to short stories, and inferring characters’ mental states from their
verbal or non-verbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these methods of testing ToM are more often
claimed to provide unreliable results. Among other things, this is because many of them put
a considerable cognitive load and require additional abilities other than ToM (Bloom and
German 2000). For example, in the standard Sally-Ann Task, participants are expected to
not only put considerable effort into remembering the details of the situation, but also reason
about a belief which is false. This is said to be much harder than recognising other people’s
true beliefs.
Secondly, many of these tests use artificial pre-scripted scenarios or static, decontextu-
alised pictures which can hardly be compared to a dynamic, real-life situation. It is worth
mentioning that in text-based tasks the context is provided through verbal descriptions of
situations and characters. This does not happen during real-life communication when listen-
ers themselves have to make proper assumptions about speakers’ mental states based on the
contextual cues which are available to them. Additionally, as observed by Byom and Mutlu
(2013, p. 3), the available tests “do not require individuals to formulate appropriate response
as if they themselves were in the situation.” This is because they consider only one answer
correct and fail to account for the fact that there may be subtle differences in individual peo-
ple’s interpretations of a speaker’s verbal or non-verbal behaviour. The differences, however,
do not have to indicate ToM deficits, because during natural communication sharing exactly
the same thoughts, feelings and intentions between partners does not take place either.
Despite the growing interest into the effect of blindness on ToM, there are still not many
tests that would be properly adapted or designed to meet the needs of blind people. This
mainly concerns adults whose ToM abilities, when compared to children, remain seriously
underexplored. Because the majority of studies in the blind population have been performed
with the intention of examining first-order ToM (i.e. attributing thought), there is a significant
shortage of tests which could be used with adults to examine higher-order ToM abilities (i.e.
attributing thought about thought). Also, there are hardly any tests aimed to compare human
abilities to recognise mental states other than beliefs.
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The main objective of this article is to explore whether people who are blind are as
successful in taking other people’s perspective as sighted people and whether they are
able to recognise speakers’ mental states in communicative situations when compared to
people who are sighted. The article reports an exploratory study performed on a group of
blind and sighted adults who were tested on their representational (first-order) and meta-
representational (higher-order) ToM abilities to make inferences about intentions, emotions
and beliefs of others.
Methods
Participants
A total group of 39 adults between 19 and 67 years of age participated in the study. There
were 19 adults with no functional vision (8 women and 11 men) who were recruited from
the Polish Association of the Blind, Blind Co-operative Society and Occupational Therapy
Workshops. The participants were congenitally blind or early-blind (i.e. they lost sight no
later than at the age of 5). Individuals with ocular-plus blindness, partial vision and who
were late-blind did not take part in the study. 20 participants with normal vision (10 women
and 10 men) were recruited from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and also
participated in the study. The participants were students and administrative/technical workers
at the university. Participant characteristics are shown in Table 3.
All participants were Polish native speakers. The participation in the study was voluntary
and all participants gave informed consent. The study was approved by the institutional
review board of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It was also permitted by the









19–25 years 6 6
26-35 years 3 5
36-45 years 4 1
46-67 years 6 8




Higher (BA degree) 1 2
Higher (MA degree) 4 6
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Material and Procedure
The study was designed to explore blind people’s ToM abilities during natural communica-
tion. For this purpose, all participants of the study were presented with 12 short dialogues
based on real life conversations overheard at bus stops, in supermarkets, on television, in
offices or restaurants. Six dialogues were chosen to test the understanding of first-order ToM
(i.e the ability to attribute mental states to a person) and in six others higher-order ToM
(i.e attributing a person’s mental states about another person’s mental states, understanding
figurative language) was examined. Additionally, the recognition of different mental states
(intentions, beliefs and emotions/feelings) was tested in both first-order and higher-order
dialogues. All dialogues took place between no more than two people and varied in exact
length between 7 and 32 s. The dialogueswere performed by professional actors and recorded
using a digital HD camera. Next, the soundtrack from the film was separately recorded.
In order to determine whether blind participants understood other people’s mental states
during communication compared to sighted participants, they were asked to listen to the
recordingwith the dialogues. Because themain intention behind this experimentwas to obtain
the effect similar to real life situations, the participants were provided with no additional
information or descriptions of what was happening in the situations, and they were expected
to make proper inferences on the basis of available contextual cues. Also for the above-
mentioned reasons, the participants were not informed about the purpose of the study until
the experiment was over. After listening to each dialogue, the participants were asked a
question about one of the speakers’ intentions, emotions/feelings or beliefs.
In order to help the participants verbalise their ideas and facilitate the analysis of their
responses, theywere given aquestionnairewith closedquestions.Thequestionnaire contained
a few possible options to choose from. Among the suggested options, only one answer was
correct and the participantswere specifically instructed to choose only one answer in response
to each question which they felt best suited their own interpretation. If the participants were
unable to formulate their own responses, they were asked to choose the option ‘I don’t know’.
If they thought that none of the provided options was appropriate, they could also offer their
own individual answers. The responses were then analysed by the experimenter and they fell
into the same categories as the suggested options (correct or incorrect), but were expressed
subjectively. Participants’ responses were considered incorrect if they avoided providing
explicit answers (e.g. parroted utterances used in the dialogues, recapitulated the main points
of the conversation), or if they provided far-fetched or incoherent responses based on faulty
assumptions. For each dialogue the participants could receive 1 or 0 points. The questionnaire
was appropriately adapted in braille and an electronic version was available to users of braille
displayers.
The blind participants’ performance was compared to sighted participants who were pro-
vided with the same dialogues, but presented as film clips. They were asked to complete
the same questionnaire by choosing one of the provided answers or offering their individual
responses. The examples of the dialogues, testing questions and answer choices which were
used in the study are presented in Table 4.
Results
In order to ascertainwhether the blind and sighted groups differed in their attribution ofmental
states, the total scores in both groups for all dialogues were calculated. Prior to performing
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Table 4 Examples of dialogues (with different mental states), testing questions and answer choices
Theory of mind Dialogue Question Answers (correct in bold)
First-order (intention) A: I have two
tickets for “Don
Giovanni.”
The woman intends to: a. boast about the tickets which she
has managed to get hold of
B: Who’s he
fighting with?
b. invite the man to the opera
A: It’s an opera. c. tell the man that she has bought
tickets for the opera which they
both wanted to see
B: Shall we meet
later?
d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
e. I don’t know
(belief) A: When did it
happen?
The woman thinks: a. it will be difficult to remove the
wine stain
B: About an hour
ago.
b. it is too late to find any shop open
and buy the wine
A: What kind of
wine?
c. they can discuss the other woman’s
problems
B: Burgundy. d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
A: That’s ok. We
can deal with it.
Is it cotton and
silk?
e. I don’t know




ones or the ones
with the subtle
border?
The woman feels: a. surprised that her husband shares
her taste and that they’ve chosen
the same tiles
B: The ones with
the border are
ok.
b. confused about which tiles to
choose and hopes her husband will





c. determined to choose the green
tiles and she tries to suggest her
choice to her husband
B: The other ones,
then.
d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
A: I like them
more, too. You
see how well we
understand each
other.
e. I don’t know
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Table 4 continued
Theory of mind Dialogue Question Answers (correct in bold)
Advanced (intention) A: What do you have
there?
The woman thinks
the man has a
problem with:
a. playing a song
B: I’ve bought Sting’s
new single.
b. opening the CD
A: Let’s hear it. (after a
short while)
c. nothing
B: Pull the tab! d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
e. I don’t know
(belief) A: We need a new
bedspread … and carpet
…
The man thinks: a. the children will not approve of the
exchange of old things for new ones
B: If a carpet, then chairs,
if chairs, then a mirror,
wardrobe and then our
kids will hate us.
b. the choice of new things will lead
to conflict between him and his
wife
A: Why? c. he and his wife can’t afford to
buy new things
B: Because we will
divorce.
d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
e. I don’t know




say that she is:
a. angry that the neighbour offended
Bart during a phone call
B: Just like you told me. b. surprised that apologizing to the
neighbour was so difficult to Bart
A: And did your world
come crashing down?
c. sorry that something tragic
happened to Bart
d. other answer (if so, suggest what)
e. I don’t know
statistical analyses preliminary assumption testing was conducted, and no violations to the
assumptions of normality (The Shapiro–Wilk: F = .93, p = .16; F = .94, p = .28) or
equality of variances [The Levene’s test: F(2, 37) = 1.32, p = .25] were found. Overall,
both groups performed slightly above chance level providing 62% (sighted participants) and
51% (blind participants) of correct responses. Only, 5% of blind and sighted participants
failed to provide any answer. Next, an independent-samples t test was conduced to compare
the scores in both groups. The analysis revealed significant differences between the group
of blind (M=6.15, SD=2.26) and the group of sighted participants (M=7.5, SD=1.82);
t(37)=2.04, p= .048.
In order to find out whether the statistically significant differences were due to the blind
participants’ inability to reason about speakers’ mental states at a higher level, the sum scores
were separately calculated for the dialogueswithfirst-order andhigher-orderToM(seeTable 5
for the mean scores). The scores were entered into an ANOVA with group (blind, sighted) as
a between-subject factor and ToM-level (first-order, higher-order) as a within-subject factor.
The analysis revealed no significant interaction between groups and ToM-level [F(1, 74) =
123
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Table 5 Mean scores for blind
and sighted groups (ToM-levels)
Mean (SD)
Blind Sighted
First-order ToM 3.21 (1.13) 3.85 (1.03)
Advanced ToM 2.94 (1.80) 3.65 (1.22)
Table 6 Mean scores for blind
and sighted groups (mental states)
Mean (SD)
Blind Sighted
Intentions 2.26 (.99) 2.8 (.76)
Beliefs 1.78 (1.03) 1.9 (.71)
Emotions/feelings 2.05 (1.02) 2.75 (.96)
.01, p = .91]. There was also no main effect for ToM-level [F(1, 74) = .58, p = .45], but
the main effect for group was significant [F(1, 74) = 4.94, p = .029].
In the analysis we also wanted to examine whether the previously mentioned statistical
differences between the blind and sighted groups were caused by discrepancies in the under-
standing of mental states made manifest by speakers in the dialogues. By doing this, we
hoped to find out whether some mental states are more difficult to recognise during commu-
nication than others. For these purposes, the sum scores for the dialogues with intentions,
emotions/feelings and beliefs were calculated (see Table 6 formean scores in the groups), and
entered into an ANOVA with group (blind, sighted) as a between-subject factor and mental
state (intention, feeling, belief) as a within-subject factor. No interaction between group and
mental state was found [F(2, 111) = 1.05, p = .35], but there were significant main effects
for group [F(1, 111) = 6.89, p = .01] and for mental state [F(2, 111) = 6.09, p = .003].
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey’s HSD test indicated that the scores for dialogues with
beliefs were significantly different from the dialogues with feelings (p= .004) and intentions
(p= .022).
Discussion
The aimof this studywas to explorewhether the lack of visionmay impact blind people’s ToM
during communication.More specifically, it was intended to examinewhether the information
people with VI are normally provided with in different communicative situations allows
them to recognise other people’s intentions, feelings and beliefs compared to people who are
sighted. To accomplish this goal, the two groups of blind and sighted participants were tested
on their abilities to attribute different mental states to speakers engaged in conversations
which were real life situations chosen to fulfil the purpose of this experiment.
The first significant finding of the study was that the blind and sighted groups differed in
how successful theywere in ToMuse. The comparison of the total scores obtained by the blind
and sighted participants indicates that vision helps to recognise other people’s mental states,
and provides more accurate information about the contents of others’ minds than language
alone. Thismay suggest that linguistic experiencemay not always compensate for themissing
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visual cues, and in specific contexts may turn out to be an insufficient source of information.
Having no access to visual cues, people may find it much harder to make proper inferences
about others’ mental states and to understand their intentions, thoughts and feelings, as it is
often the case during a phone conversation. Although the individuals will be able to interpret
a verbal message by making some inferences about people’s mental states from their pitch,
tone of voice or other prosodic features of speech, their interpretations may still differ from
what they would understand, if they could observe speakers’ facial expressions, gestures and
other non-verbal cues. For this reason, in some situations it may be necessary to provide blind
people with relevant information they cannot access. Such attempts have been already made
by introducing audio-description in media and by providing blind individuals with recorded
information about the appearance or non-verbal behaviour of film characters. Much less
popular is live audio-description which provides the information in real-time during lectures,
football matches or informal meetings. The findings of the present study suggest that it may
be vital that audio-description become part of natural communication, especially when the
information blind individuals cannot access and easily infer from what people say is crucial
for the interpretation of messages.
As indicated above, the study also revealed the differences between the blind and sighted
groups in the recognition of specific mental states. Overall for both groups, inferring what
speakers’ thought was more difficult than inferring what they intended to do or what they
felt on a given occasion. Although this issue calls for further and more detailed research, it
appears that recognising people’s beliefs requires reaching deeper into the contents of their
minds than recognising their emotions or intentions which are more ostensively manifested.
As a result, one can conclude that mental states vary in difficulty and require different degrees
of effort. It is also possible that attributing thoughts to others operates on a different level of
ToM than attributing other mental states. Accordingly, people’s success in mindreading may
depend onwhat mental states they are expected to recognise in others. Because previous ToM
research has mainly involved the recognition of other people’s beliefs, which (compared to
other mental states) may be the most difficult to recognise, more attention should be paid to
intentions, feelings and emotions in future studies.
Despite significant differences in attributing particular mental states, the performances of
the groups participating in the study did not differ in the dialogues with first-order and higher-
order ToM. This was regardless of whether the participants had to mentalise about thoughts,
feelings and intentions of speakers, identify what mental states the speakers attributed to
others, or what they wanted to communicate using figurative language. This indicates that
both blind and sighted participants have fully developed ToM and they are able to make use
of this ability to interpret utterances in different communicative situations. It also appears
that any differences in the understanding of other people’s mental states between blind and
sighted individuals result only from perceptual limitations of the blind participants and their
inability to observe on-going communicative situations. The differences are not related to
developmental deficits which would impair advanced ToM abilities.
Although in the study both groups were found perfectly able to make full use of their ToM
abilities, they did not perform as successfully as it might have been expected. This surprising
finding led us to the conclusion that during natural communication people may not read that
much into the intentions, beliefs and emotions of others, and they may concentrate more on
the general meaning of a message. Apart from the fact that individual people may be more,
or less predisposed to reflect on the mental states of others, they may avoid mentalising
about possible, (hidden or overt) mental states of speakers and save their cognitive effort
during communication. It is possible that the individuals analyse a speaker’s behaviour more
carefully only when it is necessary, for example, when the speaker’s words are confusing or
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ambiguous. This may be in accordance to the previous studies by Keysar et al. (2003) who
have observed that ToMabilities of adults are not fully incorporated into their comprehension.
Although the individuals are adequately equipped and fully able to use them, most of the
time they keep ToM ‘in the box’, saving it for other, perhaps more challenging tasks.
Another explanation may be that the signal people receive during communication is too
complex to single out one specific thought, intention or feeling a speaker makes manifest.
Therefore, any answer the participants thought they could providemight seem incomplete for
them. It is also important to remember that despite our efforts to make tasks used in the study
as similar to real-life situations as possible, they were not identical to natural communication.
This means that the participants might not have obtained as rich contextual information as
they would normally get from conversation partners, which could have had an effect on their
performance and obtained results.
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